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01. Introduction 
In the United States, both engineers and contractors are held to building codes to ensure 
infrastructure completes its useful lifetime. This includes designing structures to withstand 
assumed loads, exposure to the wind and rain in addition to common wear and tear, as well as 
building it using proper means and methods. If these codes are adhered to, a building should 
stand through its service life, roads should remain intact and smooth and bridges should span 
across great lengths uninterrupted. Because of America’s diverse landscape, each state has 
adopted its own building specifications to design against common issues in the region. Plain 
states will see higher winds, the West Coast must guard against earthquakes and the Southeast 
region worries about hurricanes, just to name a few examples. These specific codes are in place 
to design against the most probable disaster, not the worst-case scenarios. However, it seems 
that the most probable case is slowly getting worse, and our specifications are quickly becoming 
inadequate preparations for what nature is throwing at us. 
The year 2017 put coastal building specifications to the test. According to the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), it was the most active hurricane 
season in over a decade; of the 17 storms large enough to be assigned names, six of them became 
hurricanes greater than a category three.1 Two of these storms made landfall in the U.S. back to 
back, Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. Hurricane Harvey made landfall in Texas, flooding much of 
Houston and the surrounding areas. Hurricane Irma first strafed the Caribbean then made its way 
up Florida leaving in its wake damage not seen Hurricane Wilma in 2005. While both states have 
codes put in place to withstand the forces of hurricanes, they seemed many structures were still  
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destroyed. Was this an atypical year for aggressive hurricanes, or were the specifications falling  
 behind what will become the norm? 
02. Background 
Hurricane Harvey made landfall just North of Corpus Christi, Texas on August 25th. It 
made landfall as a category four but was downgraded after a day to a tropical storm. Hurricanes 
as intense as Harvey rarely make landfall in Texas, but it is not impossible. What made it 
particularly devastating was the massive amount of flooding incurred. Typically, as a storm or 
hurricane makes landfall it continues inland until much of its energy is dissipated. Harvey, 
however, stalled over Southeastern Texas. This did not stop it from dumping what some experts 
estimate to be 51 inches of rain in some locations, as well as achieving 134 miles per hour 
sustained winds.2 This rainfall along with massive storm surge created flashfloods and sustained 
flooding throughout much of the state. The storm surge varied wildly, ranging from three feet 
above ground level to up to 12 feet above ground level at its peak.3 It is estimated that 30,000 
people were displaced from their homes.2 The tropical storm would later circle back over the 
Gulf of Mexico and make landfall once again near the Texas-Louisiana border. 
Hurricane Irma started its path of destruction as a tropical storm over the Caribbean 
Islands. Puerto Rico took the brunt of the storm, devastating the infrastructure of the small 
island. Irma then pushed on through the Florida Keys, eventually making landfall in Florida on 
September 10th. It struck as a category four, setting records for intensity with its windspeeds 
clocking in at 185 miles per hour sustained for 37 hours straight5. After making landfall at the 
southern tip of Florida, it continued straight up the center of the state, finally fizzling out over  
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Georgia. The storm surge produced varied by location, but places such as Naples saw 
up to seven feet of surge; the Keys saw up to 10 feet6. As violent of a storm as Irma was, the 
rainfall achieved was relatively low for storms of its size. The most rainfall reported came 
from Fort Pierce on Florida’s east coast at 16 inches, a drop in the bucket to Harvey’s 51 
inches7. Irma has been documented as the most intense storm to make landfall in Florida since 
20046. 
Hurricanes Harvey and Irma hit with less than a week of time in between. While both 
category four hurricanes, they brought two distinctly different problems to the places they 
devastated. Harvey brought unprecedented flooding to Texas, most notably Houston. A high 
storm surge coupled with record breaking rainfall amounts lead to widespread destruction of 
homes and businesses. With storm surges measured around 12 feet, that is enough to cover the 
first floor of most buildings. Once the rainfall is included, some coastal areas experienced second 
floor flooding as well. Flooding was the chief cause of damage to infrastructure from Hurricane 
Harvey. This contrasts Hurricane Irma, where the damage was incurred by its high sustained 
winds. Irma’s storm surge was only a few feet under Harvey, but it lacked the massive amounts 
of rainfall. Irma dumped less than one third of the rain experienced by areas effected by Harvey. 
It did so, however, with windspeeds not experienced in decades. At times, as much as 70,000 
square miles were experiencing Irma’s storm force winds7. As a comparison, at its peak 28,000 
square miles around Houston experienced major flooding7. Both storms caused a crisis and 
evacuations, leaving hundreds of thousands without homes. Each brings unique challenges to 
building designers in the region. A concise comparison of Harvey and Irma can be found in 
Table 1 in the appendix. 
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03. Irma and Florida State Building Code 
Having a long history combating hurricanes, Florida’s building code is set up to protect 
against hurricanes based on multiple factors. Florida establishes risks based primarily on 
building location and occupancy type. This creates a baseline for likeliness of damage to occur 
and loss of life associated if this damage were to cause the structure to fail. When analyzing 
building types, the code splits buildings into four primary categories: 
I. Buildings that represent low risk to human life; i.e. agricultural facilities, minor storage 
facilities and screen enclosures 
II. Buildings and other structures not covered in categories I, III and IV 
 
III. Buildings that represent substantial hazard to human life; i.e. buildings that are 
primarily used for public assembly with greater than 300 people, primary and secondary 
education facilities and civil infrastructure such as power generation and water 
treatment plants 
IV. Buildings that are designated essential facilities; i.e. emergency treatment facilities with 
surgery capabilities, emergency response facilities, aviation control infrastructure and 
buildings critical to national defense function9 
The full text and descriptions can be found in Table 2 in the appendix. Categorizing 
infrastructure like this gives certain buildings priority over others, offering more stringent design 
specifications for buildings that would be detrimental to lose. The second consideration is what 
wind zone the building falls into geographically. Florida has these wind zones set up based on 
proximity to the coast and typical observed windspeeds during hurricanes. They are split up into  
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four general zones based on ultimate design wind speeds, VULT: 
1. VULT greater than 130 mph but less than 140 mph 
 
 
2. VULT greater than 140 mph but less than 150 mph and greater than one mile from the 
coast 
3. VULT greater than 150 mph and less than 170 mph or greater than 140 and less than 170 
and less than one mile from the coast 
4. VULT greater than 170 mph10 
 
These wind zones are shown as Figures 1 and 2 in the appendix, laid out geographically 
and associated with building category. Listed above are specifically for Category II and 
Category III buildings without surgical healthcare capabilities. Buildings that fall into Category 
III with surgical healthcare capabilities and Category IV buildings increase VULT by 10 to 20 
mph based on proximity to the coast and increases the number of wind zone gradations. 
This puts these buildings into higher design specification criteria. While there are other smaller 
specifications for what can and cannot go into buildings, wind zones and building type dictate 
most of Florida Building Code regarding hurricane design. 
A hurricane with the magnitude of Irma will challenge any building, regardless of the 
codes it is built to. However, higher category buildings could be expected to fare better than 
those of a lower category. Analyzing each category case by case, one can determine if the 
building codes are adequate. The lowest category, Category I structures, will be neglected in the 
analysis due to its extremely low probability of loss of life and high chance of structural failure 
or critical damage. 
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Destruction present in typical Category II building in 
the Florida Keys after Hurricane Irma. The wall of 
this home was completely sheared off by the high wind 
speeds12. 
 
The lowest category to be studied are Category II structures. Arguably, these types of 
structures were devastated the most by Irma. Category II structures are anything not specifically 
covered in the other three categories. 
This includes houses, mobile homes, 
stores and other low-occupancy 
structures. What separates Category 
I from II is the risk to human life 
associated with the structure. If the 
primary purpose of the structure is 
occupancy or business, and the 
occupancy does not exceed 300, it is 
a Category II structure. The Florida 
Keys, where Irma passed over with the highest intensity, suffered major damage. Per FEMA 
estimates, 90% of homes were damaged in the storm, with 25% of homes totally destroyed12. 
The Keys are in a zone where Category II structures can expect to experience 180 miles per hour 
windspeeds and should be built as such11. The basic windspeed is noted at 140 miles per hour11. 
When it made landfall in Key West, Irma had windspeeds of 130 miles per hour, sustained13. 
Looking at the observed windspeeds and going by the Florida Building Code, most buildings 
should have survived accruing some minor damage. Buildings like the one pictured above are 
common in the Florida Keys, where the high wind speeds coupled with a sharp drop in pressure 
sheared off the walls of this house. Roof damage was common throughout Florida, being the 
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major source of damage observed in the FEMA estimate12. Destruction of Category II structures 
is what made Irma such a devastating hurricane for most people as it displaced many from their 
homes. 
Category III and IV structures are buildings that pose a significant threat to human life 
should they fail. This includes certain healthcare facilities and buildings whose occupancy 
regularly exceeds 300 people. This would include large businesses, schools and medical 
facilities where people regularly assemble. What separates III from IV, specifically for medical 
facilities, is surgical capacity. Category IV structures are those able to provide surgery or 
structures supporting surgical facilities. One such instance was the Baptist Health’s Fisherman’s 
Community Hospital. Situated in the Florida Keys, one of the areas hit hardest by Irma, it 
provided local healthcare to the central Keys. Patients in need of surgery, however, were flown 
into Baptist Health’s South Florida branch. This puts it in Category III, which in the Keys is 
supposed to withstand 180 miles-per-hour windspeeds11. The roof of the structure was destroyed, 
and Baptist Health is now operating out of tents after seeing sustained winds of just 130 miles 
per hour14. 
However, out of all the Category III and IV structures in the path of hurricane Irma, very 
few fared as poorly as Baptist Health. According to analysis done at The University of Hawaii, it 
was the only hospital to be closed longer than seven days15. While more than 20 facilities 
directly hit by Irma saw some form of loss of use time, all but Fisherman’s Hospital reopened 
after less than 7 days15. This is significant because this shows that nearly all of Category III and 
IV buildings withstood the brunt of Irma and were reopened shortly after Irma passed. It is also 
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difficult to determine whether these loss of use times were directly attributed to structure failures 
or simply just precautionary evacuation measures but given the duration it is unlikely structural. 
Analyzing the impacts of Hurricane Irma on the state of Florida, it is clear that the critical 
infrastructure was maintained. That being said, the largest impact of Irma was on Florida’s 
civilian population. Of all structures effected, Category II made up the bulk of those destroyed or 
damaged. Category III and IV structures saw some significant damages but maintained their 
usability even if they experienced some loss of use time. This shows that category III and IV 
building codes seem to be effective in safe-guarding against most hurricane damage, with very 
few exceptions. Buildings that were directly in the path of Irma were able to stay standing and 
maintain their function. Category II buildings were devastated, mostly because Irma was such an 
intense hurricane. Irma displayed some of the strongest sustained winds observed in over a 
decade, and it would be impractical to design all Category II structures to combat this type of 
extreme event. Additionally, portions of damage to Category II structures comes from flooding, 
which is not addressed in the building code categorization procedure; the building codes are 
primarily used to combat against high wind speeds. Because it is difficult to split the FEMA 
damage estimates into flooding versus wind damage categories, it is hard to establish how many 
Category II structures could have been preserved had the building code protected against higher 
wind speeds. 
04. Harvey and Texas State Building Codes 
Florida withstood the impact from Irma and is still rebuilding. It will be many years 
before everything is as it once was. Even as a region that is used to bearing the brunt of a 
hurricane season, Florida was hit quite hard. It has a long-standing history of extreme weather 
and has building codes to suite. Texas, on the other hand, does not immediately come to mind as 
hurricane-prone. Texas is in a region that is not under a great threat from hurricanes. As a result, 
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Texas building codes are incredibly lax when it comes to protecting against hurricane force 
winds. In fact, Texas does not mandate a state-wide building code16. Texas only recommends 
that if a county wants to adopt a building code, it must be complaint to either the International 
Building Code (IBC) or International Residential Code (IRC), depending on the use of the 
structure. While both IBC and IRC incorporate flood-resistant code sections, Harris County did 
not mandate either be followed17. This makes it incredibly prone to water damage in areas that 
are affected. In addition to lax flood requirements, the hurricane requirements are almost non- 
existent. According to the Texas Minimum Construction Requirements, “…the housing must be 
improved to mitigate the impact of potential disasters (e.g., earthquake, hurricanes, flooding, and 
wildfires) in accordance with State and local codes, ordinances, and requirements.”18. This 
standard is incredibly lax in regard to protecting against hurricanes, essentially only bringing up 
the issue if the inspection deems an area deficient. This leads to a region that is terribly under- 
protected against many natural disasters. 
Harvey caused massive amounts of flooding across the state, causing major private 
property losses. However, it effected major institutions too. Texas’s hospitals were hit hard with 
an influx of people seeking shelter and medical help. In a report done by the Texas Hospital 
Association (THA), the majority of hospitals were unprepared to receive this major spike in 
patients19. They were also ill-prepared to move critical care patients or those that required more 
intense care19. The THA gave recommendations to better plan for events like this if they were to 
happen in the future. Also according to the THA, Harvey closed down 20 different hospitals 
either due to flooding or power loss19. In comparison to the number of hospitals across the state 
of Texas, this is not a large amount of hospitals. However, when you look at the amount of 
hospitals that were closed in the proximity of Houston compared to the number of hospitals in 
the county, this is quite devastating. This lack of available care facilities combined with a large  
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influx of people seeking care and shelter put incredible strain on hospitals in the area. It is 
possible that a universal building code in Texas could protect against most scenarios of flooding, 
but it is unlikely that a standardized set of codes could have stopped the flooding and failure of 
these hospitals. 
In the aftermath of Harvey, Texas plans to implement more flood protection 
infrastructure. Included in this are improved reservoirs and a new dike designed to stop the 
higher interval-rate floods20. Two of the reservoirs used to temporarily restrain flood waters 
have been deemed “high-risk” by the Army Corps. Of Engineers20. These structures pose a great 
risk of large loss of life or property and should be addressed immediately. The new dike would 
be used to buffer against the amount of rain required to create a flooding situation. 
Although Texas has minimum building requirements and the option to adopt a building 
code, it is hard to incorporate any sort of counter measures to what Harvey unleashed. Hurricane 
Harvey was such a freak accident that it is almost impossible to adopt any sort of construction 
standard to mitigate the losses against over 50 inches of rain in a single event. Without living 
underground or in bunkers, it is impossible to stop the damage. The amount of rain seen in Texas 
was incredibly abnormal, and most locations are not designed to safeguard against the high-end 
outlier storms. This was evident in Texas as homes and businesses were damaged beyond repair 
in one of the worst flooding events to happen in Texas in recent history. 
05. Analysis and Conlusion 
In areas that are prone to hurricanes, building codes are a necessity. In the southwest 
region, Florida being the case study, it was shown that buildings built to higher code standards 
faired better than those that were in lesser categories. This is crucial to the well-being of the 
region, as the buildings that are built to these higher standards are the most important- hospitals, 
military installations, and large gathering places that pose a high risk to large amounts of 
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casualties. Being hit with hurricanes year after year, Florida has adapted its building code to 
protect its critical infrastructure. While loss of private property, especially people’s homes, is a 
terrible loss, it is not cost effective to build every home to resist a category five hurricane. 
Florida’s prime area of protection was safe-guarded due to its strict building codes. 
 
Texas on the other hand experienced a large loss of personal property and saw many 
hospitals close. While these issues cannot be directly tied to the lax building codes present in 
these hurricane regions, it can be argued that implementation of basic codes could have 
prevented some of the panic and closures. Houston experienced a loss of the majority of its 
hospitals and went into a crisis. Massive amounts of people went to these places to seek shelter 
only to find they were not able to house the patients currently check in, let alone thousands more. 
Standardized building codes could have prevented some power outages by mandating utility 
locations or generator fortifications. However, the flooding experienced during Hurricane 
Harvey would have rendered these codes a moot point. 
In the two states analyzed studying two hurricanes of the same magnitude, it was shown 
that the state with minimum building codes faired better. Florida’s codes protected it’s critical 
infrastructure and maintained a sense of control despite having a handful of hospitals shut down. 
The hospitals that did shut down only experienced a few loss of days, with the exception of one 
hospital that was permanently closed in the Florida Keys. Texas, having no standardized 
minimum building codes, experienced major shut downs to its healthcare infrastructure and 
personal property. This goes to show that a set of building codes, particularly one catered to 
defend against hurricanes, is extremely effective in safeguarding against critical infrastructure 
damage. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
Table 1- Comparing Harvey and Irma in intensity using common parameters in assigning 
hurricane category. 
 
Hurricane Category Windspeeds Rainfall Pressure Storm Surge 
Harvey 4 
134 mph 
(sustained) 
51” 
938 
millibars4 
Up to 12’ 
Irma 4 
185 mph 
(sustained) 
16” 
915 
millibars8 
Up to 10’ 
 
Table 2- Building categories from Florida’s Building Code handbook, “Table 1604.5- 
Occupancy Category of Buildings and Other Structures.”9 
 
Category Description 
 
 
I 
Buildings and other structures that represent a low hazard to human life in the event of 
failure, including but not limited to: 
• Agricultural facilities. 
• Certain temporary facilities. 
• Minor storage facilities. 
• Screen enclosures. 
II Buildings and other structures except those listed in Risk Categories I, III and IV. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
Buildings and other structures that represent a substantial hazard to human life 
in the event of failure, including but not limited to: 
• Buildings and other structures whose primary occupancy is public assembly with an 
occupant load greater than 300. 
• Buildings and other structures containing elementary school, secondary school or day 
care facilities with an occupant load greater than 250. 
• Buildings and other structures containing adult education facilities, such as colleges 
and universities, with an occupant load greater than 500. 
• Group I-2 occupancies with an occupant load of 50 or more resident patients but not 
having surgery or emergency treatment facilities. 
• Group I-3 occupancies. 
• Any other occupancy with an occupant load greater than 5,000. (a) 
• Power-generating stations, water treatment facilities for potable water, waste water 
treatment facilities and other public utility facilities not included in Risk Category IV. 
• Buildings and other structures not included in Risk Category IV containing sufficient 
quantities of toxic or explosive substances to be dangerous to the public if released. 
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IV 
Buildings and other structures designated as essential facilities, including but not 
limited to: 
• Group I-2 occupancies having surgery or emergency treatment facilities. 
• Fire, rescue, ambulance and police stations and emergency vehicle garages. 
• Designated earthquake, hurricane or other emergency shelters. • 
• Designated emergency preparedness, communications and operations centers and 
other 
facilities required for emergency response. 
• Power-generating stations and other public utility facilities required as emergency 
backup facilities for Risk Category IV structures. 
• Structures containing highly toxic materials as defined by Section 307 where the 
quantity of the material exceeds the maximum allowable quantities of Table 307.1(2). 
• Aviation control towers, air traffic control centers and emergency aircraft hangars. 
• Buildings and other structures having critical national defense functions. 
• Water storage facilities and pump structures required to maintain water pressure for 
fire suppression. 
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Figure 1- Design wind speeds in Florida for Category II and Category III buildings without 
surgical healthcare after the 2010 revision to the Florida Building Code11. 
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Figure 2- Design wind speeds in Florida for Category III buildings with surgical healthcare and 
Category IV buildings after the 2010 revision to the Florida Building Code11. 
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Figure 3: Loss of use time in days for medical facilities in the path of Hurricane Irma15. 
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